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ABSTRACT
Group identity is known to exert a powerful socio-psychological influence on behaviour but to date has been largely explored as
a uni-dimensional phenomenon. We consider the role of multiple dimensions of identity, asking what might happen to ingroup
and outgroup perceptions and the resulting implications for cooperation. Carefully selecting two politically charged identity
dimensions documented to have similar strength and to be largely orthogonal (religious belief and views about government
size), we find that priming individuals to consider both dimensions rather than one has a noticeable effect on behaviour. Moving
from one to two dimensions can produce a significant increase in ingroup allocations at the expense of fairness to outgroup
individuals, although the effect varies as we switch from primarily considering religion to government size. Evidence suggests
that the heterogeneity of such effects is related to the degree of “harmony” between groups in the dimensions concerned.
Introduction
Do you consider yourself Democrat or Republican? Religious, agnostic or atheist? How about your views on climate change,
abortion, gun control? Meeting someone who shares your views on any of these issues or more can help construct a shared
sense of identity and with it a tendency towards ingroup sentiment.1, 2 Numerous studies have found that even quite tenuous
forms of group identity can produce remarkable ingroup bias, with random allocations of a color or an arbitrary label often
being sufficient.3, 4 To date, a large body of work in this area has been directed towards uni-dimensional identity: the idea
that individuals often fixate on a single salient dimension which defines themselves, e.g., race, gender, political affiliation
or nationality etc. Nobel prize-winning economist and philosopher, Amartya Sen argues that this tendency for “us vs them”
thinking has led to much bloodshed and suffering.5
However, in practice, identity is much more nuanced. There are infinitely many dimensions on which identity can be defined
and it is hard to imagine anyone who has a narrow uni-dimensional focus in general. Attend a conference on gender issues and
you may feel that your gender identity has become more important; later you may have a discussion on recent political events
which instead brings your political affiliation to the forefront. Research has shown that priming different dimensions of identity
can have disparate influences on performance in quantitative/verbal tests, cooperation and economic choices.6–11
When multiple dimensions of identity are present, things become even more complex. How does one juggle the many ways
in which one is similar or different to others and how does this influence decisions to help or hinder others? The way individuals
react to and manage these cross-cutting and polarising dimensions of identity would have broad implications for harmony in
society.12 These issues motivate our study of how additional dimensions of identity influence individuals’ behaviour and the
mechanisms behind them. While there has been some research in social psychology, political science and economics examining
how the social and economic factors behind identities affect their relative strength13–17, they do not directly manipulate the
salience of different dimensions of identity. Hence, they do not speak to our research agenda of studying the psychological
mechanisms behind effects of multiple identity dimensions.
More related to our work, is a literature on multiple categorisation which examines how multiple dimensions of social
identities can have an effect on inter-group relations, see Prati et.al. for a review.18 Studies have found that when many
non-overlapping (exogenous) dimensions of identity are salient, the complexity of identities, by reducing simple social
categorisation, can lower inter-group friction. In other contexts, effects of multiple identities are however more nuanced.
Nevertheless, most of such work has focused on the cognitive aspects of categorisation and neglected the social aspects of
categories. When dimensions of identity themselves have moral and political connotations, effects can become even more
complex. Without a controlled study it is not clear how multiple dimensions of identities might interact with their social content.
In this pre-registered study19, we experimentally investigate the impact of additional dimensions of identity on ingroup
bias (or outgroup discrimination) in a context where identity dimensions are politically charged. We recruited a sample of 961
participants in America using the Prolific platform between 20th May and 9th June 2021. Based on responses to questions
posed, participants were classified into groups to make their identities salient. Subsequently, participants played a series of
third party dictator games where they were asked to allocate resources between two different partners of known identity in a
single dimension. For example, if this dimension was attitudes towards government size, one partner might be in favor of small
government, the other in favor of large government. These allocations were then used to measure the extent of ingroup bias.
We compare using separate treatments, the extent of bias when identities consist of two salient dimensions, to when identities
consist of only a single salient dimension. Our two dimensions of identity — based on opinions about 1) government size and
2) religion — were carefully selected in line with past research which finds that these are two factors of similar importance and
largely orthogonal in the respective political dimensions of economic and social conservatism/liberalism.20 These dimensions
of identity also speak to the recent increase in political polarization in America.21, 22
Our basic results mirror standard findings in that there are strong ingroup biases throughout — participants allocate more
to those who share a common identity. However, there is some heterogeneity in the magnitudes of ingroup bias. When only
a single dimension is salient, the amount of ingroup bias is significantly smaller for the religion dimension compared to the
government dimension. These low levels of ingroup bias on the religion dimension are present despite strong group identity
recorded in the post experiment survey. We refer to identity dimensions with mild levels of ingroup bias despite strong group
identity as “harmonious”. Identity based on attitudes towards religion hence seem to be in a domain which is more harmonious
than that based on attitudes towards government size.
Furthermore, we find that compared to when only a single dimension (either government or religion) is salient, making the
second dimension salient as well also changes behaviour. Again, the domain of identities matters — our results suggest that
the effect of adding a second dimension differs depending on how “harmonious” the initial single dimension was. When we
consider allocations under the more harmonious dimension (religion), making a second less harmonious (or more discordant)
dimension (government) salient results in a sharp increase in ingroup bias. In contrast, for allocations on the more discordant
dimension (government), making the second dimension (religion) salient has muted effects. This is counter-intuitive as we
might assume that adding a separate orthogonal dimension should never worsen ingroup biases in the first dimension. However,
it seems that effects can go in the other direction, by changing the domain to a more discordant social context.
Results
To ground our discussion, we first describe the distribution of identity groups in our study. Table 1 shows that there are
relatively strong levels of polarisation on each of the religion and government dimensions. 58% of participants disagree with
the statement “The world was created by a divine entity” while 31% disagree with the statement “Government intervention is
good for society”. There is a negligible relationship between these two dimensions of identity, phi-correlation = -0.17.
Government intervention is good for society
The world was created by a divine entity Disagree Agree Total
Disagree n = 139 n = 417 n = 556
Agree n = 167 n = 238 n = 405
Total n = 306 n = 655 n = 961
Table 1. Breakdown of participants who agreed/disagreed with the religion and government statements.
Treatment Effects
Here, we analyse the aggregate treatment effects. In particular, we compare levels of ingroup bias when the two dimensions
of identity (religion and government) are salient, to the alternative when only one dimension of identity (either religion or
government) is salient. Ingroup bias is measured as the difference between allocations made to an ingroup member versus an
outgroup member.
Figure 1 compares ingroup bias for the religion and government dimensions separately. Observe that in all cases, ingroup
bias is significantly positive (p < 0.001 for all cases, one-sided sign test) — allocations towards ingroup members are
significantly greater than that towards outgroup members. This is consistent with the existence of strong identity effects relating
to religious belief and views about government size. In the post-experiment survey, we measured their identity strength by
eliciting their feelings of closeness to their ingroup on an 11-point Likert scale (0 to 10), see the Appendix for more details. On
average, participants stated an average of 7.18 points which is significantly different from being neutral (5 points), two-sided
sign test, p < 0.001. Their feelings of identity strength are also strongly correlated with allocations to their ingroup, see
Supplementary Table S1.
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Figure 1. Effects of multiple salient dimensions on ingroup bias by identity dimension. Plots of 95% confidence intervals of
the mean in each treatment. Ingroup bias is the difference (in the percentage of resources) between allocations made to an
ingroup versus an outgroup in a third-party dictator game.
However, we also note that there is some heterogeneity in ingroup bias across the cases. When only a single dimension of
identity is salient, ingroup bias is significantly lower for allocations on the religion dimension compared to the government
dimension (p = 0.005, two-sided Mann-Whitney test). When both dimensions of identity are salient, the amount of ingroup bias
is however indistinguishable for allocations on the religion and government dimensions (p = 0.803, two-sided Mann-Whitney
test). The effects of multiple dimensions on ingroup bias can be seen to be dependent on whether allocations involve the
religion or government dimensions of identity. Making a second dimension salient increases ingroup bias for allocations on the
religion dimension, but has negligible effects for allocations on the government dimension.
Table 2 confirms the last observation using a multiple regression analysis with various controls. On the religious dimension,
two salient dimensions of identity, compared to one salient dimension results in an increase in ingroup bias of 7.6 percentage
points, Wald-test, p = 0.012. By contrast, on the government dimension, there is an insignificant decrease in ingroup bias
of 0.12 percentage points, Wald-test, p = 0.966. This 7.7 percentage point difference is statistically significant, Wald-test,




Marginal Effect on ingroup bias of:
Two Salient Dimensions 7.615** -0.118
(3.035) (2.746)
Observations 1437
Table 2. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions, relative to one salient dimension, on ingroup bias in each identity
dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses
ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions and dummies for the dimension of
allocation. Includes controls for strata, session and order fixed effects. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at
individual level in parentheses.
Possible Explanations
Differences in Identity Strength?
The treatment effects suggest that there are some fundamental differences between identity defined with respect to religion and
government. One possible explanation might be that stronger identities on the government dimension have spillover effects on
the religion dimension, raising the importance of religious differences and consequently increasing ingroup bias. There are
several pieces of evidence which suggest that this is not the case.
Firstly, questions from our post-experiment survey indicate that the strength of identities on the religious dimension is
greater compared to the government dimension. Table 3, Column 1 shows that on a scale from 0 to 10, their feelings of
belonging to their government ingroups were on average 0.57 points lower compared to religious ingroups, Wald-test, p < 0.001.
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Secondly, there is no evidence that making the government dimension salient increases feelings of belong to one’s religious
ingroup. Table 3, Column 2 shows that there is no significant effect of the number of dimensions on feelings of belonging to
one’s religious ingroup, Wald-test, p = 0.688, nor one’s government ingroup, Wald-test, p = 0.832. Thus, it is unlikely that
the rise in ingroup bias in the religion dimension when multiple identities are salient can be explained via the aforementioned
mechanism.
Dep Var: Feelings of belonging to ingroup (1) (2)
Government dimension -0.568*** -0.654***
(0.121) (0.210)
2 salient dimensions × Religion dimension -0.091
(0.226)




Strata, Session and Order Fixed effects X X
Observations 1437 1437
Table 3. Effects of multiple salient dimensions by identity dimension on survey-measured feelings of belonging. See the
Appendix for more details. Ordinary least squares regressions with individual-question level observations. * 0.10 ** 0.05 ***
0.01. Standard error in parentheses clustered at the individual level.
Signalling
A second possible explanation might be that the higher levels of ingroup bias on the government dimension spillover to
the religion dimension when both dimensions are salient because of a signalling effect. In particular, individuals might see
membership of one group as a possible signal that their partner may also be a member of another group — especially when
multiple dimensions of identity are salient. In our experiment, this might explain our results if an individual believes a partner
who shares a group identity on the religious dimension is more likely to also have a shared identity on the government dimension
when both dimensions are salient. Since the government dimension has higher levels of ingroup bias, such beliefs would lead to
higher levels of ingroup bias on the religion dimension — even if ingroup bias on the single salient religion dimension is small.
We are able to examine such an explanation as in the post-experiment survey, participants were asked about their beliefs
about the chance that ingroup/outgroup member on the religion (government) dimension is also an ingroup/outgroup member
on the government (religion) dimension, see the Supplementary Materials for more details. Using this, we can calculate for
each dimension, in percentage points, the extent to which participants are more likely to believe that an ingroup member on
a particular dimension is also an ingroup member on the other dimension (relative to an outgroup member on the particular
dimension). For exposition purposes, we refer to this as their ingroup correlation beliefs.
Subgroup: Religion Government
Dimension Dimension
Marginal Effects on Ingroup bias of:
2 salient dimensions 8.050*** -3.979
(3.052) (3.152)
Ingroup correlation beliefs 0.188*** -0.001
(0.048) (0.044)
Observations 1232
Table 4. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions relative to one salient dimension, and ingroup correlation beliefs, on
ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level
observations. It regresses ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions, dummies for
the dimension of allocation and ingroup correlation beliefs. 215 observations excluded due to out of range beliefs which are
treated as missing. Includes controls for strata, session and order fixed effects. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at individual level in parentheses.
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Results of our analyses are inconsistent with the above signalling explanation. Firstly, while Supplementary Table S2 shows
that on average, participants have positive ingroup correlation beliefs, there are limited effects of making two dimensions of
identity salient. Secondly, controlling for their ingroup correlation beliefs in regressions similar to Table 2 does not explain
away our earlier results on the heterogeneous impacts of multiple dimensions of identity on ingroup bias; in fact differences are
even bigger. Table 4 shows that while ingroup correlation beliefs have some explanatory effect on ingroup bias on the religion
dimension, even after controlling for it, the effect of two salient dimensions on ingroup bias is still 12 percentage points higher
on the religion dimension compared to government dimension, Wald-test, p = 0.002.
Identities in conflict vs Identities in Harmony
In the previous section, we showed that differences in identity strength or signalling cannot explain our treatment effects. We
next consider how another facet of identities — the degree of “conflict” or “harmony” between identity groups defined on
specific dimensions — may explain our results. While opinions on government and religion are polarized, we first note an
interesting difference between sentiment directed towards those who do not share identity with respect to religion as opposed to
government. Table 5 examines the marginal effect of identity strength on ingroup bias in each identity dimension. A 1 point
higher answer on the 11-point Likert scale for identity strength is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in ingroup
bias on the government dimension, but only a 2.2 percentage point increase in ingroup bias on the religion dimension. The
difference is statistically significant, Wald-test, p = 0.021. That identity strength matters much less for allocation decisions on
the religion dimension suggests that there is a greater sense of harmony between individuals of different religious opinion, as
compared to government opinion.
Subgroup: Religion Government
Dimension Dimension
Marginal Effect on ingroup bias of:
Feelings of belonging to ingroup 2.223*** 4.308***
(0.593) (0.732)
Observations 1437
Table 5. Marginal effects of feelings of belonging to ingroup, on ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are from
an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses ingroup bias on the interaction
between feelings of belonging to ingroup and dummies for the dimension of allocation. Includes controls for strata, session and
order fixed effects. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses.
A greater sense of harmony between groups should be associated with higher concerns of fairness and mutual respect. We
have several pieces of evidence that illustrate this. Using an exact 50-50 split between ingroups and outgroup as a proxy for
concerns of fairness and mutual respect, Figure 2 shows that for decisions in the 1 dimension treatment, participants show much
higher concerns for fairness in the religion dimension. When making allocations on the religion dimension, 75 percent are
an equal split. In contrast, when making allocations on the government dimension, only 64 percent are an equal split. This
difference is statistically significant, two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.007.
Figure 2. Proportion of participants choosing an equal split (50-50 allocations), by treatment. Plots of 95% confidence
intervals of the mean in each treatment.
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Evidence from our post-experiment survey is also consistent with the above. Participants were given a multiple choice
question on how they decided on their allocations. In the first two sessions, there was no explicit option to choose fairness,
but if they selected “other”, it was possible to indicate fairness or mutual respect as a reason. In the third session, we added
in fairness as an explicit option. In the one-dimension treatment, 38 out of 237 either selected fairness as their reason or
gave an open-ended answer involving fairness or mutual respect for the religion dimension compared to 23 out of 248 for
the government dimension. The difference in proportions of participants who gave fairness or mutual respect as a reason is
significantly different, two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.025.
However, when making decisions in the two-dimension treatment, it seems that these concerns for fairness evaporate. Figure
2 shows that participants are almost as likely to choose an equal split on the religious dimension compared to the government
dimension — there is no significant difference in the proportion of equal splits for the religion and government dimensions in
the two dimension treatment, two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.166. Likewise, in the post-experiment survey, participants
are equally likely to indicate fairness or mutual respect as a reason for allocations in the two dimension treatment. 30 out of 239
for the religion dimension, and 27 out of 237 for the government dimensions indicate mutual respect and fairness as a reason
for their allocation. This difference is not significant, two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.697.
The above results suggest that making the relatively discordant government dimension salient has spillover effects on
the relatively harmonious relations in the religion dimension. While interactions on the religion dimension are usually fairly
harmonious, the knowledge that others might differ on the government dimension (for which there is greater conflict) crowds
out any considerations of fairness or mutual respect that apply to the religion dimension. Interestingly, this spillover effect is
asymmetric — we do not observe similar spillover effects of the religion dimension on the government dimension. Ingroup bias
on the government dimensions and measures of concerns for fairness/mutual respect remain relatively unchanged when the
religion dimension is made salient as well, see Figures 1 and 2.
Discussion
In our paper, we find evidence that raising the salience of additional dimensions of identity can have effects on ingroup bias —
inattention to other possible dimensions of identity is thus likely important. However, our results are more nuanced compared
to related research. In contrast to research on multiple categorisation where non-overlapping categories reduce ingroup bias, we
find an increase in ingroup bias based on religion when multiple dimensions of identity are salient — this occurs despite the
multiple dimensions being relatively uncorrelated.
Possible explanations for the failure of multiple categorisation in the literature include the causal centrality and dominance
of particular identities23 and the conceptual relation of categories24. However, exploring the respective potential mechanisms of
differences in identity strength and signalling, we do not find any evidence consistent with them. One reason could be that our
study involves dimensions which are more politically charged, involving elements of what columnist Erza Klein calls issue and
identity based polarisation.25
We find evidence that there is even more nuance amongst such (strong) polarised identities. In particular, it is possible to
classify identities into different “domains” based on the kinds of intergroup relations. In our experiment, the religion identity
dimension involves norms of fairness and mutual respect which are seemingly less present in the government identity dimension,
perhaps due to social norms which suppress religious discrimination. Other studies have found evidence that on ethnic identity
dimensions, similar social norms which suppress racial discrimination also seem to be present.26
Consequently, there appear to be different kinds of interactions between these domains when multiple dimensions of identity
are present. Results show that the government dimension has negative spillover effects on the religion dimension reducing
the apparent “harmony” that exists in our sample between those with or without religious identity (which exhibits itself as
a low level of ingroup bias in allocations). However, the religion dimension does not have positive spillover effects on the
government dimension, proving incapable of generating harmony where it did not already have a foothold. We surmise that this
may be because salience of identities on the government dimension “activates” thinking on political partisanship lines. Such
asymmetry also highlights the fragility of any notion of fairness and harmony between different identity groups.
Broadly, our results suggest that when studying multiple dimensions of identity, it is also important to consider the social
context of dimensions of identity rather than just attempting to draw general conclusions. We believe that more work needs to
be done in linking the sociology of inter-group interactions to the psychology of multiple identities.
Methods
This study used an online experiment to examine the effect of the number of salient dimensions of identity on identity strength
and ingroup bias. The experiment had two different treatments which were conducted between subjects. There were two main
stages in the experiment. The first stage was an identity inducement stage split into two treatments. Participants were randomly
assigned to a treatment in which either 1) one dimension of identity was made salient, or 2) two dimensions of identity were
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made salient. In the second stage, participants completed an incentivized third-party allocation task which was used to elicit
their level of ingroup bias. At the end of the experiment, there was a post-experiment questionnaire which included standard
demographic questions together with questions concerning feelings of closeness to their ingroup, and their beliefs about the
distribution of identities on each dimension (which were incentivized). The full experimental script is provided in Appendix B.
Identity Inducement
In our experiment, we focused on two main dimensions of political identity inspired by Everett20: 1) economic and 2) social
conservatism/liberalism. Participants were shown a general statement on limited government (“Government intervention is
good for society”) and/or religion (“The world was created by a divine entity”) and asked to choose where they stood on the
issue (agree/disagree). After choosing their position, participants were then shown their implied group membership based on
their choices, with graphic symbols for each group to further increase identity-salience. In the one-dimension treatment, they
were only asked about one (random) statement. In the two-dimension treatment, they were asked about both statements in a
random order — this order was kept the same for any questions thereafter. For completeness, participants in the one dimension
treatment were asked in the post-experiment survey to choose their stand on the other dimension.
Our focus on political identities was based on observations in an early pilot that people form strong identities around their
political affiliation. Religion and government size were chosen because they had several useful characteristics as discussed by
Everett20:
• They are documented to be quite divisive and as such there is potential for them to initiate identity formation. Religion
and Limited Government are 2 items in the 12-item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) which weigh
heavily in the “Social Conservatism” and “Economic Conservatism” factors (see Table 1 in Everett20)
• They are of similar “strength” to avoid any asymmetry between dimensions complicating the effect of making another
identity dimension salient. Religion and Limited Government have high factor loadings (> 0.8) in social and economic
conservatism respectively (see Table 4 in Everett20).
• They are not strongly correlated which preserves the notion that both dimensions are relatively independent. In the paper,
the two factors had a weak correlation of 0.09 which was not significant at the 0.05 level (see Table 1 in Everett20).
We also note that there is no obvious ordering in terms of status or hierarchy across different opinions in these two dimensions.
Third-Party Allocation Task
We used a third-party allocation task to elicit participants’ levels of ingroup bias in an incentivized way. Participants had to
decide how they would allocate 100 experimental credits between two randomly selected other participants in the following
manner. Firstly, they decided for a given dimension of identity (i.e, religion or government), how to allocate the credits in 3
different cases: 1) if one of the two selected participants has an ingroup identity while the other has an outgroup identity, 2)
both have an ingroup identity and 3) both have an outgroup identity. In the two-dimension treatment, the fact that on the other
dimension of identity, the participant might have an ingroup or outgroup identity was highlighted.
Secondly, each participant had to decide whether they wanted to implement the allocation based on their aforementioned
decisions. If not, they could instead elect to equally divide the experimental credits or randomly divide the credits between the
two participants. For those in the two-dimension treatment, they had to make the same set of decisions on the second dimension.
Each participant’s decisions were then used to determine the payoffs of two randomly selected other participants. For those in
the two-dimension treatments, one set of decisions was randomly selected to be implemented.
From this task, we can measure their ingroup bias by calculating: Allocationingroup−Allocationoutgroup. This can be done
for both the raw allocation (before they made the second decision), and the effective allocation (after they made the second
decision). In our main analysis, we used effective allocations to calculate ingroup bias as these were the final decisions that
were implemented for payment. Results are qualitatively similar and in fact quantitatively larger if raw allocations are used to
calculate ingroup bias. See Supplementary Tables S4 - S6 for the corresponding results using raw ingroup bias.
Post-experiment Questionnaire
In the post-experiment questionnaire, we collected standard information on participants’ demographic characteristics like their
birth year, gender, education level, personal income level and ethnicity etc. Furthermore, we also had questions relating to
the task like their understanding of the instructions as well as how they made their allocation decisions. These were used in
robustness checks of our main analysis. All results go through qualitatively, controlling for these variables in similar regressions,
see Supplementary Tables S7 - S10. We also had several questions which were used to construct variables used in exploring
potential mechanisms behind our results.
Firstly, all participants were asked to give estimates of the unconditional conditional distributions of participants’ identities
on the religion and government dimensions. In particular they were asked about (i) the percentage of all participants who belong
to the group that agree/disagree with the religion statement, (ii) the percentage of all participants who belong to the group that
7/40
agree/disagree with the government statement, (iii) the percentage of the participants who agree with the religion (government
for session 3) statement that agree/disagree with the government (religion for session 3) statement, (iv) the percentage of the
participants who disagree with the religion (government for session 3) statement that agree/disagree with the government
(religion for session 3) statement. These estimates were elicited in an incentivized way: one of the four estimates was randomly
selected for payment; the closer the estimate to the true value, the higher the payment.
Using these estimates and participants’ identities, we constructed participants’ ingroup correlation beliefs by calculating:
Prob(Ingroup on second dimension | Ingroup on first dimension) − Prob(Ingroup on second dimension | Outgroup on first
dimension). In cases where the first dimension does not correspond to the dimension that was conditioned on in questions
(iii) and (iv), conditional probabilities had to be calculated via Bayes law and could fall outside of the possible range 0−100.
These out-of-range conditional probabilities are treated as missing in the analysis. The distributions of calculated and directly
observed conditional probabilities treating out-of-range values as missing are similar to the distributions of only directly
observed conditional probabilities, k-smirnov test, p=0.804.
Secondly, participants were asked to indicate on an 11-point Likert scale (0 to 10), to what extent they see themselves as
belonging to their ingroup on religion and government dimension respectively. This question was adapted from the measure of
group identification in Doosje et.al.27, and is used to measure participants’ identity strength on each dimension.
Data Collection
The experiment was programmed in Otree28 and conducted on the online research platform Prolific (www.prolific.co).
Recruitment was restricted to participants currently residing in the United States and having a Prolific approval rate not lower
than 95. Ethical approval for conducting the experiment was obtained from the University of Warwick Humanities and Social
Sciences Research Ethics Committee (ref. HSSREC 178/19-20). All experiments were performed in accordance with the
relevant guidelines and regulations, with informed consent being obtained from all participants on Prolific.
We conducted 3 sessions during late May and early June in 2021. In total 480+240+241 = 961 participants completed the
experiment in the 3 sessions respectively. Of this, 485 participants were in the one-dimension treatment, while 476 participants
were in the two-dimension treatment. They were paid a completion fee of $0.9 together with a bonus fee based on decisions
made by participants during the experiment. On average, participants spent 7 minutes in the experiment and received a payment
of $1.41 which is above the recommended hourly payment rate of $9.60 for Prolific experimental participants.
Stratified randomisation was used to reduce sampling error. There were six strata given by a participant’s political and
religious affiliation as indicated on Prolific’s demographic screener: Demographic/Republican/Independent × Religious/Non-
religious. These two variables were chosen for stratification because they are closely related to the identities in the experiment
and we suspected that behaviour in the experiment could differ by participant’s identities (this is indeed true, opinions on
government and religion are significantly different across strata, Kruskal Wallis test, p<0.001 for both government and religion).
Simple random sampling was applied within each stratum: half of the participants in each stratum were randomly assigned
to the one-dimension treatment, while the other half was assigned to the two-dimension treatment. We implemented an equal
size for the one dimension and two dimension treatments because pilots indicated no significant differences in the standard
deviation for ingroup allocations between them. Supplementary Table S3 compares demographic variables in the two treatments
and show that they are relatively similar.
Our main analysis focuses on the measures of effective ingroup bias calculated from participants allocation decisions.
Note that in the two-dimension treatment, each participant has a measure of ingroup bias for each dimension. In the one-
dimension treatment, each participant has only one measure of ingroup bias for the dimension he/she faces. In total, we have
485+476×2 = 1,437 data points.
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Supplementary Information: Additional Tables and Figures
Dep var: Ingroup Bias (1)




Strata, Session and Order Fixed effects X
Observations 1437
Table S1. Correlation between ingroup bias and survey-measured feelings of belonging. Ordinary least squares regressions
with individual-question level observations. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard error in parentheses clustered at the individual
level.
Dep var: Ingroup correlation beliefs (1) (2)








Strata, Session and Order Fixed effects X X
Observations 1232 1232
Table S2. Effects of multiple salient dimensions on ingroup correlation beliefs. Ordinary least squares regressions with
individual-question level observations. Out of range beliefs are treated as missing. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard error in
parentheses clustered at the individual level.
1-salient-dimension 2-salient-dimensions Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) (p-value)
Age 35.730 35.624 0.106
(13.177) (12.993) (0.900)
Gender
Female 0.493 0.475 0.018
(0.500) (0.500) (0.577)
Male 0.489 0.498 -0.009
(0.500) (0.501) (0.775)
Other or preferred not to say 0.019 0.027 -0.009
(0.135) (0.163) (0.366)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
Continued on next page...
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1-salient-dimension 2-salient-dimensions Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) (p-value)
Highest education level completed
Less than High School Diploma 0.019 0.008 0.010
(0.135) (0.091) (0.172)
High School Diploma 0.351 0.326 0.025
(0.478) (0.469) (0.415)
Associate’s Degree (AA/AS) 0.076 0.118 -0.041*
(0.266) (0.323) (0.030)
Bachelor’s Degree (BA/BS) 0.386 0.370 0.016
(0.487) (0.483) (0.613)
Master’s Degree (MA/MS/M.Eng) 0.140 0.143 -0.003
(0.348) (0.350) (0.906)
Doctoral Degree (PhD) 0.012 0.017 -0.004
(0.111) (0.129) (0.567)
Professional Degree (e.g., JD, MD) 0.016 0.019 -0.002
(0.128) (0.136) (0.777)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
Annual personal income
Under $10,000 0.270 0.242 0.029
(0.444) (0.429) (0.312)
$10,000 to $19,999 0.124 0.132 -0.009
(0.330) (0.339) (0.689)
$20,000 to $29,999 0.109 0.109 0.000
(0.312) (0.312) (0.999)
$30,000 to $39,999 0.107 0.097 0.011
(0.310) (0.296) (0.588)
$40,000 to $49,999 0.076 0.088 -0.012
(0.266) (0.284) (0.501)
$50,000 to $59,999 0.074 0.065 0.009
(0.262) (0.247) (0.580)
$60,000 to $69,999 0.035 0.053 -0.017
(0.184) (0.223) (0.187)
$70,000 to $79,999 0.054 0.057 -0.003
(0.225) (0.232) (0.833)
$80,000 to $89,999 0.031 0.040 -0.009
(0.173) (0.196) (0.452)
$90,000 to $99,999 0.025 0.021 0.004
(0.155) (0.144) (0.699)
$100,000 to $124,999 0.047 0.034 0.014
(0.213) (0.180) (0.278)
$125,000 to $149,999 0.012 0.017 -0.004
(0.111) (0.129) (0.567)
$150,000 and above 0.035 0.046 -0.011
(0.184) (0.210) (0.382)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
Continued on next page...
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1-salient-dimension 2-salient-dimensions Difference
mean (sd) mean (sd) (p-value)
Ethnicity
White 0.693 0.662 0.031
(0.462) (0.474) (0.304)
Black or African American 0.072 0.101 -0.029
(0.259) (0.301) (0.114)
Native American or American Indian 0.004 0.000 0.004
(0.064) (0.000) (0.158)
Hispanic or Latino 0.064 0.063 0.001
(0.245) (0.243) (0.955)
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.126 0.143 -0.017
(0.332) (0.350) (0.438)
Others or Multiracial 0.041 0.032 0.010
(0.199) (0.175) (0.421)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
If understood instructions
Yes 0.988 0.987 0.000
(0.111) (0.112) (0.974)
No 0.012 0.013 -0.000
(0.111) (0.112) (0.974)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
Made allocation decisions
Based on my preferences 0.404 0.487 -0.083**
(0.491) (0.500) (0.009)
Based on what I wanted to do 0.223 0.200 0.023
(0.416) (0.400) (0.381)
Based on what I thought the experimenter expected me to do 0.004 0.006 -0.002
(0.064) (0.079) (0.640)
Randomly 0.010 0.011 -0.000
(0.101) (0.102) (0.976)
Based on gut instinct 0.177 0.130 0.047*
(0.382) (0.337) (0.043)
Based on what I thought was the socially desired thing to do 0.047 0.034 0.014
(0.213) (0.180) (0.278)
Based on what I thought was fair† 0.097 0.078 0.019
(0.296) (0.268) (0.293)
Other 0.037 0.055 -0.018
(0.189) (0.227) (0.195)
Means here reflect proportions within the corresponding population.
Sample size (n) 485 476
Table S3. Sample Characteristics. †This option only appeared in the third session. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard




Marginal Effect on Raw Ingroup Bias of:
Two Salient Dimensions 11.336*** -0.521
(3.269) (2.938)
Observations 1437
Table S4. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions, relative to one salient dimension, on raw ingroup bias in each identity
dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses
raw ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions and dummies for the dimension of
allocation. Includes controls for strata, session and order fixed effects. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at
individual level in parentheses.
Subgroup: Religion Government
Dimension Dimension
Marginal Effects on Raw Ingroup Bias of:
2 salient dimensions 11.295*** -5.955*
(3.314) (3.307)
Ingroup correlation beliefs 0.184*** -0.015
(0.052) (0.048)
Observations 1232
Table S5. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions relative to one salient dimension, and ingroup correlation beliefs, on raw
ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level
observations. It regresses raw ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions, dummies
for the dimension of allocation and ingroup correlation beliefs. 215 observations excluded due to out of range beliefs which are
treated as missing. Includes controls for strata, session and order fixed effects. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at individual level in parentheses.
Subgroup: Religion Government
Dimension Dimension
Marginal Effect on Raw Ingroup Bias of:
Feelings of belonging to ingroup 2.572*** 4.676***
(0.636) (0.783)
Observations 1437
Table S6. Marginal effects of feelings of belonging to ingroup, on raw ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are
from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses raw ingroup bias on the
interaction between feelings of belonging to ingroup and dummies for the dimension of allocation. Includes controls for strata,




Marginal Effect on ingroup bias of:
Two Salient Dimensions 7.424** 0.101
(3.067) (2.752)
Observations 1437
Table S7. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions, relative to one salient dimension, on ingroup bias in each identity
dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses
ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions and dummies for the dimension of
allocation. Includes controls for strata, session, order fixed effects as well as whether the participant indicated they understood
instructions, whether the participant indicated they made allocation decisions randomly or based on what they thought the
experimenter expected them to do, the participant’s age, gender, highest education level completed, personal income level and
ethnicity. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses.
Dep Var: Feelings of belonging to ingroup (1) (2)
Government dimension -0.577*** -0.682***
(0.123) (0.215)
2 salient dimensions × Religion dimension -0.094
(0.229)





Strata, Session and Order Fixed effects X X
Observations 1437 1437
Table S8. Effects of multiple salient dimensions by identity dimension on survey-measured feelings of belonging. Ordinary
least squares regressions with individual-question level observations. Controls: whether the participant indicated they made
allocation decisions randomly or based on what they thought the experimenter expected them to do, the participant’s age,
gender, highest education level completed, personal income level and ethnicity. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard error in




Marginal Effects on Ingroup bias of:
2 salient dimensions 8.045*** -4.337
(3.085) (3.169)
Ingroup correlation beliefs 0.191*** 0.008
(0.049) (0.046)
Observations 1232
Table S9. Marginal effects of two salient dimensions relative to one salient dimension, and ingroup correlation beliefs, on
ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level
observations. It regresses ingroup bias on the interaction between dummies for the number of salient dimensions, dummies for
the dimension of allocation and ingroup correlation beliefs. 215 observations excluded due to out of range beliefs which are
treated as missing. Includes controls for strata, session and order fixed effects as well as whether the participant indicated they
understood instructions, whether the participant indicated they made allocation decisions randomly or based on what they
thought the experimenter expected them to do, the participant’s age, gender, highest education level completed, personal
income level and ethnicity. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses.
Subgroup: Religion Government
Dimension Dimension
Marginal Effect on ingroup bias of:
Feelings of belonging to ingroup 2.176*** 3.919***
(0.602) (0.739)
Observations 1437
Table S10. Marginal effects of feelings of belonging to ingroup, on ingroup bias in each identity dimension. Estimates are
from an ordinary least squares regression using individual-question level observations. It regresses ingroup bias on the
interaction between feelings of belonging to ingroup and dummies for the dimension of allocation. Includes controls for strata,
session and order fixed effects as well as whether the participant indicated they understood instructions, whether the participant
indicated they made allocation decisions randomly or based on what they thought the experimenter expected them to do, the
participant’s age, gender, highest education level completed, personal income level and ethnicity. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.
Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses.
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Identity Priming 2 (2 Salient Dimensions)
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Identity Priming and Elicitation (Religion Dimension Salient)
Identity Elicitation (Religion Dimension Salient)
Identity Priming (Religion Dimension Salient)
20/40
Identity Priming 2 (Religion Dimension Salient)
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Identity Priming and Elicitation (Government Dimension Salient)
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Identity Priming 2 (Government Dimension Salient)
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Third-party Allocation Task (2 Salient Dimensions)
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Allocation for 1 Ingroup 1 Outgroup (2 Salient Dimensions)
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Allocation Decision for Government Dimension (2 Salient Dimensions)
29/40
Third-party Allocation Task (Religion Dimension Salient)
Allocation Task Instructions (Religion Dimension Salient)
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Allocation for 1 Ingroup 1 Outgroup (Religion Dimension Salient)
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Allocation for 2 Outgroups (Religion Dimension Salient)
Allocation Decision (Religion Dimension Salient)
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Third-party Allocation Task (Government Dimension Salient)
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Allocation Task (Government Dimension Salient)
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Identity Elicitation for non-Salient Dimension in 1-Dimension treatment
Identity Elicitation for Government Dimension (Religion Dimension Salient)
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Post-Experiment Survey Questions
Questions related to decision task
Did you understand the instructions? [Did understand., Did not understand.]
Please write here if there is anything unclear about the study
In the allocation task, how did you make the decisions? (Select the option which is most important to you.)
[I made the decisions based on my preferences., I made the decisions based on what I wanted to do., I made the decisions
based on what I thought the experimenter expected me to do., I made the decisions randomly., I made the decisions based
on gut instinct., I made the decisions based on what I thought was the socially desired thing to do., I made the decisions
based on what I thought was fair.*, Other: Please describe in the textbox below.]
Demographic questions
In which year were you born?
What is your gender?
[Male, Female, I would prefer not to say, Other (Please describe below if you wish)]
What is your highest education level completed?
[Less than High School Diploma, High School Diploma, Associate’s Degree (AA/AS), Bachelor’s Degree (BA/BS),
Master’s Degree (MA/MS/M.Eng), Doctoral Degree (PhD), Professional Degree (e.g., JD, MD)]
Which state in the US are you currently living in?
What is your annual personal income?
[Under $10,000, $10,000 to $19,999, $20,000 to $29,999, $30,000 to $39,999, $40,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $59,999,
$60,000 to $69,999, $70,000 to $79,999, $80,000 to $89,999, $90,000 to $99,999, $100,000 to $124,999, $125,000 to
$149,999, $150,000 and above]
Consider the total income brought into your household by all members including yourself. What percentage of this total
household income is made up of your income?
[None - 0%, 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-30%, 30-40%, 40-50%, 50-60%, 60-70%, 70-80%, 80-90%, 90-100%, All - 100%]
] What is your ethnicity?
[White, Black or African American, Native American or American Indian, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Pacific Islander,
Others or Multiracial]
In general, what is your political affiliation?
[Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, None]
What is your religious affiliation?
[Baha’i, Buddhism, Candomble, Christianity (e.g. Baptist, Church of England, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Jehovah
Witness, etc.), Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Non Religious (e.g. Agnostic, Atheist, No Religion), Paganism,
Rastafari, Santeria, Shinto, Sikhism, Spiritualism, Taoism, Unitarianism, Zorastrianism, Other, Do Not Wish to Answer]
*This option only appeared in the third session.
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